

## **The infrastructure of Educational Technology at University Level: A Case Study of Latif Ebrahim Jamal National Science and Information Centre (LEJ-NSIC), University of Karachi**

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### **ABSTRACT**

*Educational technology implies a behavioral science approach to teaching and learning. Keeping in view the role of Educational Technology in educative process, the study was designed to evaluate the contribution of Latif Ebrahim Jamal National Science and Information Centre (LEJ-NSIC) at university level in the provision and promotion of educational technology. The study highlights the rationale behind establishing LEJ-NSIC, its strengths and weaknesses in terms of obstacles in the spread of educational technology. Therefore, this research not only examines the existing infrastructure of LEJ-NSIC but also puts forward recommendations for the up-gradation of existing facilities.*

### **INTRODUCTION:**

“Educational technology as the development, application and evaluation of systems, techniques and aids to improve the process of human learning”.<sup>1</sup>

Aggarwal<sup>2</sup> indicates that teachers’ use of instructional technology can help in sustaining students’ attention, increase the meaningfulness of the complicated and abstract concepts, encourages deep processing, and boosts class performance through increased content acquisition.

Ashby<sup>3</sup> has identified four revolutions in education. The first revolution occurred when the task of educating the young was shifted from home to school. The second revolution was adoption of written work. The third revolution came with the invention of printing press. The fourth revolution is the development in electronics that has given birth to the use of educational technology to enhance learning of education and to maximize the effectiveness of educational process to impart twenty first century skills as denoted by the model below.

The Partnership for 21st Century skills has developed a unified, collective vision for 21st century learning that will strengthen American education. The Partnership created the Framework for 21st Century Learning, which describes the skills, knowledge and expertise students must master to succeed in work and

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shall provide a reasonable time, to all the three parties to the dispute, to review their stands and go through all the factors of this 'dispute', and thus, arrive at a viable, reasonable and practicable conclusion.

The process involves and accommodates all sections of the people of J&K along with all the political parties, in connection with the settlement of the 'Kashmir Problem'.

It has kept all the options open for the Jammu and Kashmir people, afterdispassionate and prudent thought.

The solution would dilute the long-standing hatred and mistrust created by the 'KashmirProblem', and would pave the way for ultimate elimination of enmity and hostility between India and Pakistan.

The 'Process' shall destroy the gold mine, created in the name of 'Kashmir dispute' by unscrupulous politicians, leaders, and agencies that have built a vicious network within the Jammu and Kashmir state, India, Pakistan and other countries all over the world, to mint money at the cost of the life and honor of the people of India and Pakistan.

The adoption and implementation of this process shall not create any constitutional and legal problem for India and Pakistan, nor shall it be prejudicial to the national interests of India and Pakistan.

By this process, the letter and spirit of the UN Charter and the demand for right and justice shall be fully honored and fulfilled.

The aforementioned special features of this 'Process' shall enable it to play the role of a sincere friend, facilitator and even a mediator between India, Pakistan and the people of Jammu and Kashmir as a whole.

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trade agreements and MoUs (Memorandums of Understanding) for hassle free trade between the two parts of Kashmir. Pakistani and Indian governments should also look into the matter urgently and formulate a policy to promote free trade relations between the two parts of Kashmir.

### **3) POLITICAL FACTOR**

After a period of five years, all the political parties and recognized leaders of the people of all the regions of the State of Jammu and Kashmir be allowed to hold a Peoples' Convention to express their views and suggestions based on the aforesaid five years' experience and for mass thinking to finally settle this dispute, which would be equitable, honorable, practicable, and above all, in the larger interests of the people of Jammu & Kashmir.

Each solution, suggested in the State Peoples' Convention, should be allotted a separate symbol, like assembly or parliamentary election symbol. Any such symbol that secures majority-support in any region should be treated as the decision of that region in favor of that solution, and should accordingly be honored and implemented, for purposes of deciding the ultimate political future of that region.

The solution suggested in this convention be placed before the people of all the recognized geographic regions of the entire Jammu and Kashmir State through a referendum, under the supervision of an impartial agency such as the Commonwealth, SAARC, Special Committee of Non-Aligned Movement, or any special committee constituted by the UN Security Council, in order to ascertain the will and opinion of the people of all these regions. The decision of the people be honored and implemented peacefully, by India and Pakistan, through the channel of UN Security Council.

In view of the above averments, it is demanded that both India and Pakistan should agree to hold free and fair elections in their respective 'controlled' territories of Jammu and Kashmir State, under the supervision of some impartial agency, without any oath pertaining to accession or sovereignty of the constitution of India and Pakistan, so that the real elected representatives of the people look after the administrative matters as well as the peoples' day-to-day problems and maintenance of law and order, for the intervening period of five years till the final settlement of the political future of the Jammu and Kashmir State. If India and Pakistan are sincere and honest about resolving the 'Kashmir problem', they should make a 'Joint Declaration', without unnecessary delay, containing the sum and substance of the above averments.

### **CONCLUSION**

This process will work in such a way that there would be no sense of defeat to India, Pakistan or the people of J&K State. There would be no break in the dialogue process. This option suggests solutions, in a stage-wise manner. It

It may be mentioned here that all Indo-Pak agreements, UN resolutions, and directions have been ratified by the parliaments of both India and Pakistan at relevant times, which have consequently acquired the sanction and force of law. During this period, the rehabilitation of more than a million refugees of Jammu and Kashmir should be ensured in their original homes in Indian held Kashmir and Jammu under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for rehabilitation of the Refugees. According to the International law, India and Pakistan cannot refuse or avoid to rehabilitate the hereditary citizens of Jammu and Kashmir State in their original residential places, who were either forcibly driven out of their original State or left with no alternative but to migrate to India or Pakistan to save their lives, and had to temporarily settle there with "refugee status". Even the Indian law does not allow the Government of India to refuse rehabilitation of the Jammu and Kashmir refugees, who are at present living in various places of Pakistan. These refugees of Jammu and Kashmir are more than a million in number. They are waiting to return to their native-state. The Indian law is clear in this regard. That is why, even a person of Indian origin, who has acquired a foreign citizenship, can easily and conveniently resettle in his/her mother-land and freely enjoy dual citizenship, i.e.,

citizenship of his/her mother-land as well as of a foreign country where he/she has settled and has acquired citizenship either by domicile or by process of naturalization, or by marriage with a woman/man of that foreign country.

The urgent need of the hour is to break the ice of hatred and take positive and concrete steps for creating a congenial atmosphere in South Asia.

The inaugural point for this purpose starts from the Jammu and Kashmir State. In this connection, the first and foremost perceivable and visible step to be taken is the starting of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service for the citizens of both sides of the actual LOC, at the earliest. This process will satisfy the aspirations of people of each region, and no region shall complain of any deprivation or imposition of any decision against the overall will of its inhabitants. Till the final disposition of the future of Jammu and Kashmir State, the Governments of India and Pakistan should take necessary steps to ensure full-fledged internal autonomy in parts of Jammu and Kashmir State, over which they exercise de-facto control and authority either in pursuance of the international agreements or under their unilaterally enacted laws.

## 2) ECONOMIC FACTOR

Free trade relations between the two parts of Kashmir (Indian occupied Kashmir and the Pakistan occupied Kashmir) are allowed. Economic factor is one of the most important and powerful factors for the sustainability of the State of Kashmir whether it remains independent or is annexed with Pakistan or India subject to the aspirations and wishes of the Kashmiri people. Trade associations of Pakistani and Indian part of Kashmir should come close and sign

## PROPOSED SOLUTION OF KASHMIR DISPUTE

### SLOW BUT STEADY PROCESS

After a thorough research work and minute examination of all the possible options for the resolution of Kashmir enigma, this paper presents a carefully drafted peace process that will definitely lead to the resolution of the Kashmir Dispute.

For the settlement of Kashmir issue in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people, the only feasible, viable, practicable, equitable and honorable way is to adopt a “**Slow but Steady Process**”. This “**Slow but Steady Process**” is based on three factors.

1. Peoples' Factor
2. Economic Factor
3. Political Factor

#### 1) PEOPLES' FACTOR

The peoples' factor of the ‘Kashmir Problem’ requires free passage and interaction of the people living on both sides of the LoC, meeting each other and exchanging views on different issues as members of ‘one geo-political family’ i.e. the Jammu and Kashmir State. For this purpose, easy travel permits should be issued to the Kashmiris, of course, consistent with the ‘security interests’ of both India and Pakistan. Duration of this experiment should be five years, to start with. The task of issuing permits for travelling, to and from the temporary LoC, can safely be entrusted to the local authorities like the Deputy Commissioner or the Senior Superintendent of Police of the concerned district of the applicant, or any special officer appointed by the State Governments of the respective side of the LOC, with the prior approval of the Government of India- in case of Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) and the Pakistan Government- in case of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). There shall be no constitutional or

legal difficulty in this matter because according to India as well as Pakistan’s own law, the question of issuing visas to their citizens for entering into the other part of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir cannot arise at all.

According to the Pakistani constitution, the Azad Kashmir is not a part of Pakistan, and is held and controlled by the Pakistani Government until and unless a peaceful settlement of Kashmir Dispute is reached. Similarly, under the authority of article 370 of the Indian Constitution, 25 provincial assembly seats have been reserved for the people of Azad Kashmir, in the Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly. In the same way Jammu and Kashmir is not a part of India. India is ruling on Jammu and Kashmir by force and against the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

Declaration in both Pakistan and India, the succession of new leadership in India, and the lack of further interest by the Soviet Union led to the disappearance of the Tashkent spirit between India and Pakistan.

### THE SIMLA ACCORD (1972) AND BEYOND

The Indo-Pakistan War 1971 was a turning point in the history of the subcontinent. Unlike the wars of 1948 and 1965, which resulted in political and military statements, India emerged as a major power after the war of 1971. An Indian scholar observed that it was the first time since independence in 1947 that the Indian policy-makers were able to get rid of their opposition with Pakistan.

Perceiving the clear superiority of the 'enemy', Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the then President of Pakistan, also opted for a policy of bilateralism with India.

The Simla Agreement was concluded on July 2, 1972 between India and Pakistan on bilateral basis without the interference of any third party. In Simla, India wanted to have a package deal with Pakistan including the settlement of the Kashmir question but Pakistan insisted on a step-by-step approach. The positions of both the parties at Simla were just opposite to their positions taken at Tashkent, where India had opted for step-by-step approach and Pakistan had insisted on a 'package deal' including the Kashmir Issue<sup>18</sup>. In Simla, India demanded that cease-fire line in Kashmir should be converted into an international boundary, thereby settling the Kashmir dispute on the *status quo* basis, but Pakistan did not want to bargain on Kashmir from a position of weakness. However, in return for the concession made by India concerning the withdrawal of troops from Punjab, Pakistan made an important concession to India over Kashmir. Pakistan agreed to the new line of control in Kashmir resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971.<sup>19</sup>

According to the new line of control, India retained the area it had captured in Kargil, Tithwal and Poonch in Azad Kashmir, this left India in possession of a better military position<sup>20</sup>. According to some Indian sources, Z. A. Bhutto privately assured Mrs. Gandhi during the Simla meeting that he would not disturb the status quo in Kashmir. Pakistan has acquiesced in de-linking Kashmir from the United Nations. However, it does not accept the Indian interpretation of the Simla Accord. The text of the Simla Accord does not contradict Pakistan's principled position on Kashmir. The Simla Agreement recognized that "*the principles and purposes of the charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries.*" It always recognizes that the "Jammu and Kashmir remains the unsettled dispute without prejudice to the recognized position of either side" and the representatives of both Governments will meet to discuss "the final settlement."

*“The jubilant Pakistanis saw the Indian withdrawal as a sign of continued erosion of Indian moral and unwillingness to fight. Possibly the whole Rann-of-Kutch was simply a Pakistani test of Indian strength and stamina”<sup>14</sup>.*

Presumably, a favorable external environment of war persuaded Ayub Khan to permit the infiltration of 3,000 to 5,000 volunteers into the Indian held Kashmir in hope that while Pakistan armed forces would engage the Indian forces in the battle, the Pakistani commandos, together with the Kashmiri freedom fighters, would wage war with the Indian army inside Kashmir. Pakistani decision-makers misperceived the number of Indian forces and the level of Indian commitment to Kashmir. They also underestimated the Indian threat advanced by Nehru in 1951 that if Pakistan ventured into Kashmir, Indian might attack Pakistan, choosing its own place and time<sup>15</sup>.

The plan failed as planners had assumed that India would not cross the international borders and would confine its military operation to Kashmir only. Regrettably, there was no general uprising in occupied Kashmir either.

The military conflict between the two countries raged all along the Indo-Pak borders in Lahore, Sialkot, Kashmir and Rajasthan sectors. The military conflict lasted for about seventeen days.

During the conflict, the outside interested parties like the United States, the USSR and the UK confined their actions to diplomatic measures; only China threatened to intervene in the conflict militarily. On 16<sup>th</sup> September 1965, China delivered an ultimatum to the Indian Government, warning of ‘grave consequences’ if the Indians did not dismantle their military structures and withdraw to their own side of the Sinking-Tibet border within three days<sup>16</sup>.

Failure of either side to win a decisive victory, international pressure, the depletion of military resources and efforts of United Nations brought about the ceasefire between India and Pakistan on 23<sup>rd</sup> September 1965.

#### **THE TASHKENT CONFERENCE (1966)**

The Soviet Union mediated between India and Pakistan on Kashmir Issue in the wake of 1965 war<sup>17</sup>.

The Tashkent Conference in January 1966 at the Tashkent city is widely regarded as a failure in Pakistan because of lack of progress on the fundamental issue of Kashmir. A limited agreement was achieved through the Soviet Union’s mediatory efforts; wearily, both sides agreed to settle the immediate issues arising out of war and set forth their respective position on the lingering issue of Jammu and Kashmir to be discussed later. The Indian Prime Minister L.B.Shastari’s sudden death at Tashkent on January 11, 1966 proved to be the death knell for the agreement as well. Hysterical reaction against the Tashkent