QUAID-I AZAM MUHAMMAD ALI JINNAH

Outline of a Political Biography (1916–1947)

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The year 1916 may be taken as a convenient date for the Quaid-i Azam's debate in the politics of the subcontinent when, by his sincere and untiring efforts, he brought the Congress and the Muslim League close together and earned the epithet of the "Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity" from Mrs Sarojini Naidu. After this he went into a long period of withdrawal from active politics in the 'twenties and early 'thirties. When he again led the Muslims in the campaign for a separate homeland beginning from 1940, the call was no longer for Hindu-Muslim unity, but for Hindu-Muslim separation. This complete reversal of viewpoint has prompted the questions in many quarters, notably among Western writers, as to "how a convinced advocate of Hindu-Muslim unity for most of his political career could become the foremost advocate of Hindu-Muslim separation. Exactly when did he change his views and why?"[1] This paper attempts to present an answer to these questions, and, though historical, religious and cultural movements of the Muslim people largely shaped the events, this study is confined to giving an outline of Mr Jinnah's political actions between 1916 and 1947.

At Lucknow in 1916, mainly due to the zeal of Mr Jinnah, the Muslim League and Congress jointly sponsored

1. C.H. Philips, in *The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives* (London: 1966), p. 32.

DR AFZAL IQBAL

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APART FROM MOHAMED ALI'S OWN WRITINGS AND SPEECHES AND MANY SECONDARY SOURCES IN INDIAN HISTORY, THE AUTHOR HAS USED THE INDIA OFFICE ARCHIVES AND MUCH MATERIAL HITHERTO UNAVAILABLE, INCLUDING CONFIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT REPORTS DURING THE PERIOD 1911-1931

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much else. As a lawyer who had studied the Muslim Law and conducted numerous court cases turning upon some of its material issues can be presumed to have a sounder knowledge of Islam than many of the semi-literate theologians whose pontific conceits may well be the despair of all true lovers of the faith. That he lived the life of an aristocrat away from the masses in whose welfare he was not seriously interested, is another line of attack. In advancing this proposition the critic forgets that the Quaid-i Azam emerged from a life of retirement when he was past sixty to lead the movement for a Muslim homeland designed to rescue his community which was bound to be submerged under hostile majority rule. Mr K.L. Gauba has, in effect, supported this very thesis with a mass of information about the Indian Muslims in his recent publication entitled *Passive Voices*. The Quaid's re-entry into politics under the double disadvantage of age and health must be attributed to the compelling circumstances of the situation and not merely to personal ambition. In the journey of life he traversed a long road. Starting from a constitutionalist and a drawing-room politician, he developed, by degrees, into a dynamic leader of men. That is the fact of basic importance about him and in this lies his true greatness.

fied for the act of political renunciation, is not quite clear. He has been singled out for this treatment, probably because his dissociation from the Congress ultimately changed the course of history by splitting the British Indian empire into two.

Finally, a few comments on the attitude of the rising generation in our country that knows singularly little about the father of the nation Its ignorance may be pitied, but the cocksureness with which it spurts out mouthfuls of borrowed cliches is inexcusable It is confidently asserted, for instance, that Jinnah's knowledge of Islam was superficial, practically non-existent, and that in this respect his attitude represented the cynicism of the politician for whom "all religions are equally useful". This does not make sense. Love of Islam appears to have been a part of his upbringing, though he was seldom crudely demonstrative about it. As a young man in his teens he had decided to join the Lincoln's Inn for legal studies when he found that this institution displayed the name of Muhammad among the great lawgivers of the world. That he regarded himself as part of the Muslim community is clear from his declared ambition to become a Muslim Gokhale. It may be added in parenthesis that Gokhale was a many-sided genius of Hindu society. He was, at once, a politician, a legislator, a social reformer, an educationist and an erudite and accomplished man of letters. It is likely that he represented Jinnah's ideal about the calibre and attainments of a leader. It is equally likely that Jinnah himself aspired to be all that Gokhale had come to be. If this reading of an earlier ambition is correct, it would be interesting to find out why he gave himself up wholly to politics and kept out of every other field that he may have initially intended to enter. The provisional answer may be hazarded that he was so deeply engrossed in law and politics that left him with little inclination to think of

of fact, not much uncharitable criticism was directed against the Quaid-i Azam while his Congress sympathies were evident and taken for granted. The non-Muslim authors who revel in painting him in lurid colours all belong to the period when Jinnah's breach with the Congress was total and irrevocable. Contemporary writings play a more influential part in moulding opinion. Few have the time or patience to dig forgotten or nearly-forgotten materials, study them alongside of current writings and strike a just balance between the spates of abuse and adulation.

The most serious charge that is usually brought against Jinnah is that he left the Congress and came over wholly to the Muslim League which, in the critics' rating, was a sectional organisation The matter is not as simple as that. The transformation, as we have seen, was not sudden. It was spread over about two decades. While some changes of this phase are discernibly clear, others are not. Those who censure this alleged transfer of allegience with a flood of words seem to forget that the Congress which Jinnah left was an entirely different organisation from the one which he had served with the zeal of a devotee. If an established political party abruptly gives up its creed, adopts new objectives and devises fresh techniques of action, it is, in effect, a new party even if it retains the old label. Few would deny the right of an individual to disown a party if it ceases to be what it had meant to him in terms of principles. In any case Jinnah was not the only Muslim leader to have severed his connection with the Congress. Eminent Muslims who started as ardent supporters of this organisation left it with feelings of repugnance at the way in which it had handled the Hindu-Muslim question. The cases of Maulana Muhammad Ali and the Ahrar leaders alone would serve to illustrate the point. Why should Jinnah alone be continued to be vili-

the only leader responsible for this omission The Aligarh school, on the other hand, has left voluminous writings. Its leaders recorded almost everything that they did. Later generations of Aligarhians have over-recorded the achievements of the *alma mater*. For later periods we have to depend almost entirely on journalistic writings most of which have perished.

The Quaid has fared rather badly at the hands of his non-Muslim colleagues and friends of earlier days who wrote their memoirs after independence. By them he is either mentioned casually or not at all. Another class of writers who did not know him personally resorts to the weapon of unconscionable calumny: he is variously reported as a "gross communalist," a "swollen-headed" man, a political "turn-coat," an "overrated politician" and what not. It is not impertinent to add that in the non-Muslim writings published before 1936 he is described in terms of respect, even glowing admiration. Writing in 1917, Mrs Sarojini Naidu spoke of his "frail body" as the abode of an unconquerable spirit. Mr Ranga Iyer stated in 1928 that Mr Jinnah could very well be the idol of the market place had he chosen that role for himself. In April 1936, the *Tribune* of Lahore exhorted his readers (Hindu readers to be sure) to extend their sympathies to Jinnah in the task of strengthening the Muslim League because he was a "nationalist" after all. This advice was meant to counteract Fazl-i Hussain's perseverance in reviving the languishing Unionist Party which he himself had created in the early 'twenties. The *Tribune* dubbed Fazl-i Hussain as a "communalist" in the light of his performance as a member of the Government. The paper went to say that in "this" particular context reality was different from appearance: the apparently "communalist" Jinnah, it added, was to be preferred to Fazl-i Hussain who had donned the "nationalist" mantle for ulterior purposes. As a matter

divided against itself. Most of the Muslim leaders looked up to the representations of the British Government for support and protection; a tiny but vocal minority had been captured by the Congress. In these circumstances Jinnah was either distrusted or feared in both camps. No wonder he was at home in neither.

Another factor obstructing our understanding of the Quaid-i Azam is that he has practically left no writings about his personal life or politics. His speeches made in the various political forums or statements issued on different political issues of the day are available either in the blue books or as independent publications. Valuable as they are, they do not help us to piece together a complete picture of the man. Unlike his illustrious namesake, Maulana Muhammad Ali, he seldom talked about himself. Whereas the Maulana's speeches and political writings furnish a wealth of autobiographical detail, one cannot gather that sort of information from Jinnah's speeches. A notable student of Pakistan affairs has roundly asserted that Jinnah did not write a single article in his life. This discovery is not genuine. At least two of his articles can be easily located. The first one on the reform of India Council has been already referred to. The other one was meant to explain the implications of the Lahore Resolution (1940) and appeared in the *Time and Tide*. The absence of autobiographical writings has given rise to speculation in which fable and fact are interlocked. It is hoped that free access to his personal papers would supply the necessary corrective by placing authentic source materials at our disposal.

This is probably an appropriate occasion to point to the dearth of worthwhile autobiographies written by the front-rank Muslim public men of the subcontinent. Published works of this class can be counted on the fingers of one hand. The deficiency is serious. The Quaid-i Azam is not

also coming to be quoted at political gatherings. The Muslim audiences idolised their spell-binders. A speech was not intended to inform or expound. It was successful to the extent that it roused mass fervour. A good speech was taken to be an end in itself. This standard pattern of political activity persisted for a long time. It was much in evidenee in the Khilafat days. Its skilful practitioners like Zafar Ali Khan, Muhammad Ali, Abul Kalam Azad and a host of others became household names. They could sway the masses, but they were unused to hard political thinking. No politician could make a public career for himself if he failed to follow the exemplars at the top. Brilliant nonconformity would cut no ice with the Muslim masses, whereas vague and woolly phrases could be trusted to make an indelible impression, paradoxical as it may appear to be.

Jinnah was a man of few words. Master of a direct style of speech, he seldom indulged in oratorical tricks. Hie arguments were always crystal clear He was a cold logician who seldom appealed to emotion. He hated to confused friends or foes with ambiguities. His experience with the highest courts of law and elitist politics had turned him into one of the most, if not the most, accomplished leader in the field of politics. Obviously, he lacked the qualifications of a successful mob orator. His name did not become a household name as those of the fiery orators with whom he had very little in common. He was known only to the upper ten He did not base his appeal on mob passions. The rank and file of the Muslim community seldom looked up to him before 1937. Those who failed to appreciate his exceptional gifts had no urge to try to gain an insight into his personality either from a distance or from close quarters. Jinnah's ingrained independence was another limitation. In the 'twenties, as he once remarked later, the Muslim community was a house

could perfect their own techniques of political action as well as the Hindus had done at the opening of the century. To make known their grievances to the rulers the Muslims began to take out huge processions and organise mammoth public meetings. Their leaders made fiery speeches protesting against the harsh and unsparing policies of Imperial Britain towards the Muslims in India as well as abroad. The Muslim journals condemned the Government in what its officials and agents called "reckless" and "violent" language. The two streams of political activity, Hindu and Muslim, had some common features. They tended to mingle for a while. And duly they did. But basically their purposes were different. The Muslims were more concerned with the problems and upheavals of the world of Islam. The Hindu objectives were not the same: attainment of colonial form of self-government was the first Hindu priority. There was also differences between the character and attainments of the leaders who led their respective followings. The Hindu leaders were generally educated men who had intensively studied the constitutional history of England and mastered the nature of Anglo-Saxon democratic processes and procedures. They were full of Western phrases about the freedom of nations and the place of individual in society. They appeared to have absorbed as much of Western political culture as was possible under the Indian sun. The typical Muslim leader was about as well educated. But he was seldom an experienced man of affairs. Ordinarily he was a man of letters or a poet or both. Critics dubbed him a "firebrand" whose speeches dealt with a variety of subjects (not always in a coherent style), that read like pieces of literature in print. Every public speech was characterised by emotional exuberance (and not argument). Every oratorical exercise was interspersed with verses from the Qur'an, the sayings of the Prophet and couplets from well-known poets. Iqbal was

those who did not toe its line. Jinnah was the first Muslim leader who thundered out for the dissent. He stood out as the unrivalled leader of the Indian Muslim community from 1937 onwards. A few years before, he could be counted as one of the Muslim leaders. Now he was *the* Muslim leader. It is just on this phase of his public career that our historians have mostly concentrated. It is not necessary to traverse the familiar ground. His "steady nerve" and "magnetic personality" are evident at every stage in the struggle for Pakistan. Before this juncture of history the "enlightened" and "advanced " sections of the Muslim community had admired him for precision of views, clarity of expression, intrepidity in debate and contempt for all temptations of place and power. But they did not quite look upon him as "one of us". The attitude of orthodox Muslim politicians towards him varied from that of suspicion to one of benevolent neutrality. The facts summarised in the foregoing paragraphs should explain, in part at least, the failure of the community to appreciate its coming leader. Still another reason will be found in the typical attitudes and techniques of Muslim politics.

With the foundation of the Muslim League in 1906 the Muslim community was said to have entered the arena of politics from which it had, thus far, kept itself out voluntarily. Actually, the Muslim League political activity was tame and spiritless. In its earlier years, this body was dominated by men who had long preached political quietism. But this state of affairs did not last long. From 1911, Muslim politics entered a new phase. The revocation of the partition of Bengal, the failure of the agitation for an affiliating Muslim university at Aligarh, the repercussions of the chain of incidents following the desecration of the Cawnpore Mosque, the Italian gangsterism in Tripoli and the conspiratorial character of the Balkans War ended the era of sluggish politics. Events showed that the Muslims

legal practice before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Those who suggest that his embittered relations with Viceroy Willingdon were largely responsible for his "flight" from India have to be reminded that he came back while Willingdon was still in the saddle and had yet more than a year and a half to go.

Who persuaded him to come back to India? Various names have been mentioned. This is not the place to adjudicate upon the claims advanced on behalf of his various friends and political disciples. It may not be out of order to suggest that it was primarily a call from within. He returned with a sense of mission. To sink or swim with his community appears to have been the resolve. Presumably he was not the same old Jinnah who came back. Occasionally he did lapse into the old strain. But on the whole he was clearer about his objectives. We need not read much into his cooperation with the Congress group in the Indian Legislative Assembly during 1935-36. He conducted himself as an Indian and as a Muslim. But as a Muslim first. "I am not in the least influenced by what has happened in the past, we can still make a new start." This seems to be the burden of his speeches addressed to Congress leadership in the earlier days of provincial autonomy. However, he had known the other party too well and long enough to expect a straight and fruitful response.

The existence of some sort of understanding between the Congress and the League in the then United Provinces about the working of the 1935 Constitution prior to the elections of 1936 is not a figment of the imagination. But it was cynically set aside by the Congress when it achieved an unexpected and unprecedented electoral success. Possession of power and the way in which it was used to hew down the Muslims exposed the thinly-veiled plans of the Congress which was out to humiliate and even eliminate

ties stood at the cross road. "Parting of ways," which ultimately proved to be a realistic assessment of the situation, may have sounded like a figure of speech at the end of 1928. The Fourteen Points were born of this mood: the Muslim problem could still be solved within the framework of a united India. Experience had damped Jinnah's enthusiasm for Hindu-Muslim unity by now Gradually it gave place to a sort of intellectual indecision. Old methods had failed. He was not quite clear about the nature of a fresh approach to political settlement as a helpful preliminary to another instalment of constitutional advance promised by Britain. This period of uncertainty could perhaps be divided into several stages that we cannot identify in the present state of our nearness to events. He may have inwardly debated the alternatives and options open to him. Lord Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare of earlier days) has stated that he could not figure out the working of Jinnah's mind during the Round Table Conference sessions (1930-31). While he was occasionally seen as a vigorous participant in the proceedings, his mind seemed to be elsewhere, apparently "he did not wish to work with anyone". Years later, Jinnah admitted the fact of this political isolation explaining that he was distrusted by the Hindu leaders as the author of Fourteen Points and by the Muslims as one-time supporter of mixed electorates. The tone and temper of Hindu delegates at the Round Table Conference once again made it abundantly clear to him that the Muslims of the subcontinent were confronted with the gravest crisis of their history, they virtually dwelt in no-man's land, their future was hanging by a thread. He could still do something about it. But not in India. He would fight his battles from England. Consequently, he wound up his affairs in Bombay. Apparently, he had every intention of spending the evening of his life in Britain. He closed his career as an active politician and started

Muslim unity, as a Hindu writer tartly put it. But his job in the third decade of the century was far more exacting than it had been in the second. Politics had come to be governed by shibboleths. Gandhi's dominance ensured that his personal and arbitrary interpretation of ethereal concepts like "inner voice" or "inner light" would exercise inexhorable veto over common sense and argument. The Congress had changed unrecognisably, and the change can hardly be regarded as a change for the better. Its vitality had been initiallly drained by irreconcilable group difference within. Later it was robbed of all initiative by the electrol calamity of 1926 when it was compelled to seek protection under the wings of the Hindu Mahasabha that had introduced a note of "no truck with Muslims" in politics. The Congress leadership promptly arrayed itself in battle order behind the leadership of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, the most ardent and vocal champion of Hindu orthodoxy during the century of British rule. The Congress and the Mahasabha spoke with one voice almost on every issue.

The atmosphere in which Jinnah could make his characteristic contribution to the orderly evolution of political life had irrecoverably vanished. But he was undaunted. He was found in the forefront of every effort to bridge the gulf between the communities and bring about a lasting political settlement. Perhaps he was a lonely figure. Few shared his optimism. Independence was the keynote of his character. Around the year 1926 he could advise his co-religionists to rethink over their exaggerated faith in separate electorates and at the same time warn the Hindus that joint electorate could not be forced on an embittered minority. The fate of the Delhi Proposals (1927), the blatantly anti-Muslim tone of the Nehru Report and finally the intolerant and unilateral decrees of the Calcutta Convention (1928) persuaded him that the two communi-

stayed in the Congress he occupied no pride of place in his own community. When the Muslims came into the Congress—even though for a short span of years—he was out of it. That is another reason why Jinnah was not understood by the Muslims As a matter of fact, it was not deemed necessary to understand him.

The collapse of the Khilafat-cum-Non-cooperation movement led to a period of political confusion that also witnessed the beginnings of the constitutional experiment known as Dyarchy. The country had been declaredly put on the road to self-government insofar as self-rule could mean anything under foreign domination. Constitutional issues assumed the utmost gravity in this context. As understood by the dominant political group, self-rule implied the right of the majority to control the government. So that unrestricted majority rule was clearly in the offing. The Muslim leadership did not view the prospect with equanimity. The Hindu majority said and did little to allay Muslim fears. On the other hand, its policies and plans continued to swell Muslim anxieties about the future. Separate electorate was the most bitterly debated question of the decade. Not a few Muslims swore by it. The Hindus rejected it with contempt and attributed every social and political evil to the existence of separate Muslim representation. Everyday life in this period was disorganised by continuous rioting between the communities which flared up at the slightest provocation. Few urban areas escaped the disastrous effects of lawlessness which occasionally and eventually assumed the dimensions of a civil war.

Jinnah re-entered politics in 1924. His faith in Hindu-Muslim unity was still untarnished. He was still alive to the necessity for the maintenance of Muslim identity. His methods were still constitutional and parliamentary His genius for compromise was still singing the songs of Hindu-

an enduring gain. The Pact continued to govern the constitutional framework up to 1936. The aftermath of Jallianwala Bagh firing ushered the Gandhian era in Indian politics, which, in turn, led to the Khilafat-cum-Non-cooperation movement. Gandhi's spectacular entry revolutionised—it would be truer to say "inverted"—the character of the Congress. Professedly it became a mass organisation from the punctilious affair of "morning suits". Having destroyed the original character of the Congress, the mind of its supreme leader began to move towards some sort of direct action for political ends. Jinnah's disrelish for these developments led to his withdrawal from the Congress. Earlier, he had resigned his seat in the Central Legislature as a protest against the governmental policy of repression symbolised in the Rowlatt Bills. The point to be grasped is that he did not hesitate to isolate himself from the ruling power as well as the most influential political party in the land. Did it foreshadow what was to come years later? The same attitude recurred in an acute form in wholly different circumstances after 1937. At the moment his genius for compromise was not relevant to the prevailing extremist sentiment. He had no option except to retreat from the field of battle. Independence of judgment demands heavy price for its exercise: Jinnah had no place on the map of Indian politics from 1921 to 1924. Apparently, there is no evidence to suggest that this phase of temporary retirement eroded his political thinking. When he re-entered politics his political personality was unimpaired. Also to be noted is the fact that Jinnah's departure from the Congress synchronised with Muslim influx into its ranks. Membership of the Indian National Congress on the part of a Muslim was known to involve a measure of political estrangement from his own people. No Muslim would be taken seriously by his own people, however stately his place in the Congress hierarchy. While Jinnah

League. The popular account of this incident left by poetess Sarojini Naidu in a few florid sentences tends to create the impression that the new entrant to the League was not a promising recruit. He made it plain to his sponsors, so it is stated, that the Muslim League would occupy the second or perhaps a secondary place in the framework of his preferences; primacy would still belong to the earlier connection. The curious fact has to be noted that it was an unusual step for a young public man educated in the British tradition to choose to belong simultaneously to two organisations that did not view the political scene from the same angle. Of course, it is possible to explain away the nonconformity by suggesting that the earlier tensions between the Congress and the League were gradually wearing out under the stress of political exigencies. Better climate for mutual goodwill, even though for a short while, had been created after the annulment of the partition of Bengal. Be that as it may, Jinnah's joining the Muslim League is not to be set aside as an incidental triviality. It was symbolic of his concern for the weal and woe of the Muslim community. It is difficult to believe otherwise of the legislator who had steered the Muslim Family Wakf legislation through the Imperial Council only a year earlier. Dual allegiance may also signify his disinclination for extremist positions as well as his genius for compromise. This was brought into strong relief almost immediately. He used his dual position to bring about a measure of understanding between the Congress and the League. This was the celebrated Lucknow Pact of 1916 by which the Congress leadership recognised the separate identity of the Muslim community and its peculiar requirements as part of the body politic.

The Lucknow Pact has been severely criticised on many counts. Some of these are quite valid. Nevertheless, it achieved some valuable results; Congress recognition of the Muslim claim to be dealt with as a separate entity was

Jinnah was strikingly different from the typical Muslim politician of his day. He started his public career as a Congress-man in 1905. Only a handful of Muslims were found in the Congress then. The Muslims had no political organisation of their own. Even if they had one, Jinnah of those days would not have gone to it. As a law student in Britain in the last decade of the nineteenth century he had been thrilled by the Liberal doctrines of the day. Liberalism was the creed of intellectuals. It stood for representative government, the rule of law, national liberty and individual freedom. These ideas became part of his being and continued to command his wholehearted allegiance almost till the end. The Indian National Congress professed to follow the Liberal principles. Young Jinnah must have thought that his natural place lay in this organisation and nowhere else. He had acted as Secretary to the patriot, Dadabhoy Nauroji, in his student days and taken part in the election campaign that had returned the grand old man to the British House of Commons on a Liberal party ticket.

Jinnah soon rose to an important position in the counsels of the Congress. He undertook a political mission to England on behalf of his party in 1913. His main job on this occasion was to press for the reform or abolition of the India Council. Recruited from among the retired pro-consuls from India, this body was viewed with marked disfavour in this land. Its advisory role was believed to be dubious. It was reputed to act as a drag on the generous impulses of a "pro-India" Secretary of State. Jinnah stated his case in the course of an article published in the *Edinburgh Review*. It is a plain and legalistic statement of facts. There is nothing remarkable about it. Judged by results, the campaign does not seem to have gone well. It was here that Mr (not yet Maulana) Muhammad Ali and Sayyid Wazir Hasan persuaded him to join the Muslim

not reveal anything more than what is already known to a common newspaper reader. Many of those who worked with the Quaid-i Azam are no more with us. The accounts coming from the remnants of this group are not always helpful. Their approach is invariably subjective. They view the leader almost exclusively from a personal angle. Rarely do they offer an explanation of the great transformation that came over his political life that constitutes the principal weapon in the armoury of those interested in representing him as a problem personality. No interpretative literature has grown around his policies. His printed speeches and statements are there. They make up an important deficiency. But their import is not fully grasped by the new generation. The editors of these collections would render a real service if they arranged their contents in such a way that each one of his statements (or a group of statements) is prefaced by an introductory note spelling out the circumstances that occasioned the utterance. After all, political speeches and statements are intelligible only in the context in which they are made. After a distance of time they are relevant only to the specialist. However, this is just one and only a minor reason why we fail to understand the leader.

It may be emphasised once again that our knowledge of the ideas and the personality of the Quaid-i Azam is rather meagre. This is amply borne out by a perusal of the September 1949 issue of the Urdu journal, *Mah-i Nau*, published by the Press Information Department of the Government of Pakistan. Practically every article appearing in this compilation was written by a front-rank leader of the Pakistan movement who had directly worked with the Quaid-i Azam. The antecedents of the authors can be inferred from their respective articles. Even a rapid glance through the pages of this publication would reveal the interesting fact that with one or two exceptions none of the contributors had personally known the Quaid for more than the last eleven or twelve years of the latter's life.

ON UNDERSTANDING THE QUAID-I AZAM

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It was over two years ago that I read a seminar paper, written for an American audience, reproduced in *Dawn* of Karachi, explaining why the Western world was at best indifferent, if not positively hostile, to the Quaid-i Azam. The author, Mr S.M. Burke, had adduced credible reasons to explain this attitude. I had not yet been half way through the article when it occurred to me that the Western world alone was not to be blamed for this ignorance. Within the country itself our own understanding of the leader, or rather the lack of it, is equally remarkable. Our stereotype of the Quaid is as follows: that he was a drawing-room politician for the greater part of his career, that he rolled in luxury and lived in Western style far from the common man, that he knew little about Islam and its tenets, and that he was a trenchant speaker in the English language. This picture may be partly true. A good acquaintance with some of the pronounced traits (which inspire a cartoonist or a caricature writer) of a leader does not necessarily help a full knowledge of his personality. Our newspapers and periodicals bring out special issues on all notable days of the national calendar. They carry numerous articles on the freedom movement and its various aspects. Protocol requires that these include a few features on the Quaid-i Azam as well. But these articles are stuffed with a repetition of familiar episodes and events. Nor do they offer an original interpretation of known facts. If all the articles published over the years were placed together, they would