

BELIEF AS SOCIAL IMMUNITY

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Abstract

Our identity is constituted by a system of beliefs. These beliefs come in our life by previous generations in centuries. Though, those beliefs are just considered on some bunch of words or having statements. Those statements are not very simple as it seems but they consider our behaviors or attitudes, as those statements are called propositional attitudes. These propositional attitudes come to us in two ways; introspection and extrospection. Both ways are helping to constitute an individual identity to affirm subject's existence for Intersubjectivity to give it social immunity, as Bermudez's symmetry thesis explains.

Key Words: belief, folk psychology, intersubjectivity, identity, symmetry thesis

Beliefs (or as I called it social immunities) are protected with different social institutions like family, marriage, religion, culture and language. Family is that institution where members of it mutually do understand those social immunities. Whereas marriage gives a contractual basis between male and female, to affirm it and make it possible that both parties would do it for one another. Religion also helps to promote it in a smooth way. But, culture fixes all such social immunities as conventions, values or norms with using of language as a tool for a cultural language. And, Language describes those social immunities for generation to generation. These social immunities have become beliefs, which are always justified by cultural language (Paul Churchland, 1984) and give them a material condition

as true. These justified true beliefs as social immunity are the main propositions for the folk psychology, which are transformed into folk stories in ancient times and later as literary works or texts to cemented those beliefs or social immunities in societies.

First of all, the question arises that 'I think therefore I am' is the only task for human being to search for his identity or its identity is beholden of beliefs. Where all such phenomena occur, or arise in human *extension* i.e. body (brain), or in human *thought* i.e. mind (mind and brain though have different syntax in the literal sense, but it qualifies analog in the semantics of folk psychology for identity theorists). Why do we have beliefs? That's because our inbuilt structure of mind to cooperate with the other world. If it's so, then why it happens in our life on daily bases in a way of different statements or propositional attitudes to consider the applications that fulfill the requirements of being to progress its life in that manner in which it want to or it intent to. And, these intentions further help the being to form its identity in his/her formal psychosocial patterns of his/her subjective world. These intentions in the form of beliefs could be our introspection (the inner way - or as it is called inner eye), and that come in our mind to that level where it has been conceived to subject as self-understandings, and extrospection (the outer way - or it is called physical eye), that come to our mind to that level where it has been conceived to subject by other minds. My concerned is to just explore that how both (inner and outer eye) work together to get a 'belief' that propounds one's justified believing, and how that help to form identity of human being in the guise of knowledge to form a belief.

Whatever it is – introspection or extrospection, always would be done by language in the analytical tradition of philosophy. Whenever we talk about 'language' or 'language of thought' process in the philosophy of mind, the word 'mind' comes in mind, but as we study it with the body as body language, then it is backed by the brain, as an organ for every action and that action is neural-action (as we know that 'mind' as a hindrance for eliminativists, as they want to eliminate 'mind' from the philosophy of mind, but 'brain' as a correspondence point and a one-to-one relation between eliminativists and identity theorists). The crux of the philosophy of language debate is in syntax and semantics. Both syntax and semantics have a one-to-one relation if one works other relates itself. Meaning comes through syntax or signs, and if signs or symbols are there then meaning is there. Both symbols

and meanings work together, but how they emerge in the human's life-world? Which kind of agency gives them birth? How do they get socialized with being? If syntax and semantics are socializing agents – from where they get the source to ignite or actualize by human state of affairs? If they are not intrinsic than they are extrinsic features - they belong to the external world of being. And if it is external then how one perceives it internally? If it's internal then it should mind-type-physicalism, again it delves in mind-brain identity problem or type identity. Let's find, how these identities arise?

The Cartesian legacy of making belief as having doubt, and using it as a tool that there could be an 'evil genius that could shatter beliefs' is truly a bedrock for the formation of true, clear and distinct belief. But, is it enough to get a true belief, though exploration of the ideas is always indebted in doubt, or there is something other than that? For doubting, basically one is aware of his surroundings, where 'basic awareness is a form of consciousness. Thus, according to the definition, to be in a state of basic awareness is to stand in a certain epistemic relation to a sensation. It is to have knowledge of the existence of a sensation on the basis of one's current experience (Hill, 117)' in his or her life-world. And in current experience, a subject knows that s/he is confined to this universe – an infinite physical universe that comprises other subject's or other minds. Here, two problems arise; the self and the others. As, these two problems, the problem of self and the problem of others are seen as symmetry thesis for Bermudez, as '*a subject's psychological self-awareness is constitutively linked to his awareness of other minds* (Bermudez, 230)'. So, when a subject gets aware to his/her beingness – finds existence of its identity as well as others existence.

Here, remembered that there is a link of one-to-one relation between subject's mind and other mind(s), and that link helps to endorse beliefs among subjects. Having food is a generalized phenomenon, e.g., a subject x is eating because that x is hungry and food is necessary for survival. So, there are many subjects $x, 1x, 2x, \dots, nx$, are eating food which brings prediction that ' x ' will eat in future, as every human being 'feels' hunger. And, feelings bring emotions, desires, beliefs, fears, and pains. Here, subject perceives his/her outer world as an observer or spectator. Perception is the process of acquiring concepts which are mediated by the strong articulations of the linguistic syntax that synthesize figures which

formulate the behaviors with different multiple realizations. Multiple realizations come through extrospection by other minds or subjects. Like, gustatory sensations of the taste of coffee and taste of vinegar are not like to have at the same one could get, because after taking the sip of coffee if someone takes a drop of vinegar, s/he feels a sensation of crippling, both qualitative conditions would be horribly different and may be no one smothering it as one do.

Armstrong (1968) argues that 'our senses' work for the making of the beliefs. Beliefs come out immediately physical existents of sensation. For looking, seeing, feeling, touching and smelling are nothing but acquiring of beliefs, or inclinations. So, 'If we deny that beliefs about sensations can be confirmed by the sensations to which they refer, then it seems we must accept one of the following propositions: (1) beliefs about sensations are groundless – they are not justified by anything; (2) they are justified by other beliefs; (3) they are self-justifying; and (4) they are justified because they are produced by reliable cognitive mechanisms (Hill, 131)'.

Beliefs regarding *fearas* an example has the behavior with intrinsic character of surviving the physicality for reliable cognitive mechanism. As we know that smooth flow of blood creates a smooth behavior order, and any clot or disruption in the flow of blood changes the behavior order. So, during a condition of fear clotting or disruption of blood occurs and it speeds up the heart beat which further changes the behavior order in which subject mainly configures itself for the condition or perception of fear. And, perception regarding fear makes the individual desires for life sustainability and that comes through memory, from where those perceptions are recalled during the situation – situation of fear. All propositions regarding fear are memorized in daily talk as suggestive manners and those are preserved in our reservoir or memory-store-house. That's why one behaves as a situation appears (e.g. situation of fear) to face it according to sociocultural norms or conventions. But, Moor (1922) says that 'sense data couldn't be possible same in two people' albeit, it helps to shape intersubjectivity.

Shapes or figures are also perceived as mind wants to see or seeing as, and/or having concepts of shapes e.g., Δ is a concept of mind as Pegasus is a concept of mind. In reality, Δ and Pegasus are not objects, that one could see or touch or universally existed somewhere

in the real sense, and they shape as objects for objectifying different shapes in a different way according to mental conception as they formed and as they appear to mind's eye with their reflected properties. If two subjects have different conceptions or propositional attitudes about any particular universal, like,

Sue said that Δ has three sides.

John said that Δ is a triangle.

Therefore,

Sue and John said that Δ is a three-sided triangle.

Though, sense data are not same but programmed intersubjectivity made it possible a generalized formation of a belief 'that Δ is three-sided triangle'. The belief 'cold war is over', could be perceived by many or 'AIDS is harmful' is open belief to others. Then here doubt or skepticism can overcome others intentions, beliefs, desires etc. If one is very well aware of such propositional attitudes, then s/he can perceive others intentions without any fallibility. There is always an explanatory gap to judge those kinds of intentions, like the desire of martyrdom, or belief of afterlife, or belief that we are living in the universe as a stroller and so on. A particular cultural language the term 'Clinton and Clinton' is elaborated in that way;

Clinton is the president of America.(1)

Here, (1) is a propositional attitude for a Native American region that how they describe 'Clinton and Clinton' into their daily talk, though (1) is very hard to understand for others than natives and also for those regions where the English language is not the first language.

Clinton was the president of America.(2)

After having (2) the first statement would be more ambiguous for nonnative American countries. Because in the same time frame, two statements could not be true, either first is true or second statement is true or both statements are false. There are many others statements like,

Clinton was a lawyer before the president of America.(3)

Clinton was secretary of state before the president of America.(4)

Clinton is a wife of the president of America.(5)

Clinton is a husband of the president of America.(6)

An individual subject, who is new to such statements and got confuse after having such beliefs. Because s/he was ignorant to these statements. Those statements are referring to such situations which are absurd till one gets to know that 'Clinton' is referent to male as well as a female in English speaking world. So actually, those statements are ascribed in this way. Only those have knowledge about such propositional attitudes which are known to this situation. Knowing the actual situation of propositional attitudes is not only subjective, it is too objective that is not dependable on one subject. Though all propositional attitudes statements are not tangible, but exist in the social context of the subjective life-world. Intersubjectivity is only possible, where external world obviously is known to the subjective internal world. That known external world of the subjective internal world is not introspection, but extrospection. Though, subject may have intuited to sparse between 'Clinton and Clinton', as

Clinton the president of America is the wife of Clinton – theex-president of America.(7)

This last propositional attitude is only distinct to those subjects, who have the actuality of that statement. Those subjects are the American citizens or foreign students. Idealizing about a relative connection of 'Clinton' and 'Clinton' is a stimulus from externalism to internalism. This stimulus occurs though internally but force or projection comes from externally. Let's see this kind of beliefs generalization in an after-image inquiry in which a victim 'Sue' accuses a taxi cab driver of his misconduct. She reported that last night she was insulted by a drunken orange taxi cab driver in front of near mall. The Sergeant investigated and found that there was not any orange cab company in the city, though there is yellow cab company. Now Sergeant has two propositional attitudes, that either 'Sue saw an orange cab' or 'Sue saw a yellow cab'. Seeing a taxi cab is a sense perception of a subject and differs in color perception is the disagreement between two subjective perceptions. Orange cab and yellow cab phenomenon challenging the Sue accusation of drunkard taxi cab driver and one could speculate that Sue might be drunk at that time or she has eyesightproblem, not to see clearly or blur eyesight issues. That's why she couldn't differentiate between yellow color and orange color. Agreement and disagreement between/among the statements couldn't testify after the incident occurrence that what was the real situation. This situation would be clear when the statements would get agree to

the real situation after having a mutual understanding between/among the subject(s). As, if Sue saw the orange cab and in the city, there is any orange cab then the description of Sue is true. Otherwise, it would be false if there isn't any yellow cab.

True or false statements come according to the situational agreement or disagreements between/among the subject(s) to get intersubjectivity. Subjective thoughts and actions agreement/disagreement occur only on the statements or propositional attitudes level. Those statements or propositional attitudes are mostly describing thoughts and actions of the subjects. If we see the propositions that 'Sue saw an orange cab' or 'Sue saw a yellow cab', so both have an inquiry and asking for the 'attention' of the subject. At that time 'Sue saw an orange cab' or 'Sue saw a yellow cab', she was attentive to seeing the cab or not, raises a question. If she was attentive then how could she saw an orange cab and not the yellow cab? If she saw an orange cab, it means there is an orange cab in the city, or she saw orange cab with a blurry eyesight. As she is insisting that she saw the orange cab and Sergeant emphasize that there is not an orange cab in the city. Fallibility, or 'errors can occur when beliefs are based on appearances that fail to do justice to the entities to which the beliefs refer. When we are misled in this way by imperfect information, we make errors that may be called errors of ignorance and those 'errors can arise when we have adequate information about the entities with which we are concerned but we fail to take this information fully into account in forming beliefs about the entities. Errors of this sort, which may be called errors of judgment (Hill, 128).

Explaining that Sue wasn't attentive and her accusational statements about 'orange cab' and 'drunk driver' are false and those (statements) only lead to 'doubt' on the accuser i.e. Sue. Because, if there isn't any orange cab in the city then the statement 'the drunk orange cab driver' doesn't exist in the possible world. Doubt on the statement confers doubt on the Sue. This doubt arises in Sergeant, which is subjective doubt and objectifying the statement of another subject. This kind of doubt degenerates the unity between subject and object and brings fallibility in the subject-object relative reality. Here, doubt is occurring in the subjective attentive phase of sensation. Doubt on attention is doubt on a statement or propositional attitude. Doubt on perceiving the object (cab) through eye – a physical organ of the body that differentiates the shapes or structures and colors of the objects as

properties. Here, doubt isn't on the physical existence of the object (cab). It's on the color of the cab that is the property of the object. Doubt of the color brings further doubt on the subjective perception and this further having doubtful statements. Such kind of doubtful statements elaborates the nature of the subject-object relation regarding the actual reality.

Sue and Sergeant are subjects, and cab and drunk-driver are objects in this situation. Here 'doubt' is a thought in the subject's intention, but clearance of thought arise in the distinction of statements or propositional attitude. Doubt perceived introspectively and statements or propositional attitudes give perception extrospectively. Doubt is created internally by extrospective objects perception. Doubt is statements or propositional attitude generated subjective past experience. Subject A's (Sargent) past experience of a yellow cab, and subject B's (Sue) past experience of an orange cab have contradictory statements about color perception followed by contrary statements of yellow and orange colors. Though, both statements, either 'Sue saw an orange cab' or 'Sue saw a yellow cab' could be proved on physical grounds to get the true statements or propositional attitude, whether aside the false statements or propositional attitude.

False statements or propositional attitude are akin to false or erroneous judgments due to fallibility in the sensations. 'Sensations belong to the wrong logical space: it is only an observation judgment, or belief, or report that can be logically consistent or inconsistent with any theory' (Popper 1959). Errors occur in sensations on two grounds, first; defect in sensory receptors, like in above example it could be possible that the subject (Sue) eyesight is weak or blur and this blur is caused by any injury or any intoxication (alcohol). In the same way, coffee taster's buds could be damage due to any injury on a tongue or could be burned out by chain-smoking. And in paralysis, one couldn't feel the sensation in his or her body. There are many disorders in which subject couldn't judge his or her normal behavior according to the required condition. The second, factor of error in sensation is 'ignorance' – ignorance of statements or propositional attitude. If a subject is ignored about the belief s/he has about an entity, which later found false to knowing true belief. That particular entity would be an erroneous judgment or erroneous belief and that error formulates erroneous reality for the subject.

The exercise of beliefs (or social immunities) is a formation of introspection and extrospection of individual, but as a practicing believer, it is an individual identity in the worldly state of affairs. Bermudez concludes it 'a subject's recognition that he is distinct from the environment in virtue of being a psychological subject depends on his ability to identify himself as a psychological subject within a contrasting space of other psychological subjects, and this self-identification as a psychological subject takes place relative to a set of categories that collectively define the core of the concept of a psychological subject' (Bermudez, 274).

So, beliefs are depended on sensations and sensations only qualify through brain-related neuronal activity. Those neuronal activities are occurring in a physical world. From where s/he perceives it and mends it according to his or her survived identity. These survived identities are the recognized communities which further collectively affirm those propositional attitudes and bring them in practicing as social immunities. After passing of times, those social immunities gain a form of belief. An individual affirms his or her identity with those acquired beliefs in which his or her survival is possible.

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