

Abstracts of Urdu Articles:**Conjunctions in the Quranic Text and its Impact on Quranic Interpretation**
(A study in the light of the books of Usuliyyin)

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Conjunctions are used to connect words, phrases, or clauses. They play vital role in construction of sentences and meaningfulness of text. All such letters are lexically formulated to transfer certain and particular meanings. The Quran is revealed in Arabic language and its pattern and diction is according to Arabic syntax and morphology. The Conjunctions that are called huroof atf in Arabic are also very important and need to be considered carefully while interpreting the Quranic text. The Usuliyyun have discussed these letters in their books in detail due to their significance. The difference of opinions leads to difference in juristic and legal commandments. The article deals with six letters in perspective of their impact upon Quranic commentary.

Legitimacy of the dome on the Tomb of Holy Prophet (SAW)

Usman Ahmad

The tomb of Holy Prophet (SAW) in current architecture was formed in 7th century A.H. in the era of Mansur Qalawoon. Before this, the grave of the Prophet (SAW) had the exceptionality and distinctiveness of being inside the house of Aysha (r.a.). This exceptionality and distinctiveness was solely for the Prophet (SAW) as the traditions reveal and prove. The dome on tomb was constructed late but no denial or refutation was made by majority of scholars from inception to date except by minority. The legitimacy of the dome on tomb can be proved on the basis of different dimensions. This article has been written to discuss different dimensions of the construction of shrine of the Prophet (SAW) and to prove the legality, rightfulness and sacredness of dome on the tomb of the Prophet (SAW).

Concept of Euthanasia in world Religions

(A critical Analysis in the light of Shariah)

Saleha Fatima

Muhammad Saad Saddiqui

With the advancements and progress of the modern world one can also observe the severe consequences of those scientific researches, inventions and experiments which produced serious and incurable diseases out of which aids HIV is always placed at top of the list. According to the doctors the very last stages of the patient affected by HIV or other incurable

73. Ibid., 23.
74. Op-cit., Kux 274.
75. Op-cit., Bergen, 71.
76. Op-cit., Marwat, 135.
77. Alex Marshall, "Managing Withdrawal: Afghanistan as the Forgotten Example in Attempting Conflict Resolution and State Reconstruction," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 18, no. 1 (2007): 72.
78. Op-cit., Rashid, 85,130.
79. Anatol Lieven, Afghanistan: What Pakistan Wants, *The New York Review of Books*, July 15, 2013, <http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/jul/15/Afghanistan-what-pakistan-wants/>, accessed on Sept. 12, 2013,
80. Ahmad ShayeQ Qassem, "Afghanistan–Pakistan relations: border Controversies as counter-terrorist impediments," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, no.1 (2007): 72.
81. Cyrus Hodes and Mark Sedra, "Chapter Two: Spoiler Groups and the Anti-government Insurgency," *The Adelphi Papers* 47 no.391 (2007): 30.
82. A. Saikal and W. Maley, *Regime Change in Afghanistan: Foreign Intervention and the Politics of Legitimacy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 59–62, 69.
83. The groups of Hekmatyar, Khalis, Rabbani and Sayaf were known as fundamentalist whereas Mujadadi, Nabi and Gailani were considered moderates.
84. Op-cit., Yousaf and Adkin, 83, 105; Op-cit., Weinbaum, 34.
85. George Arney, *Afghanistan* (London: Machelin House, 1990), 136.
86. Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: The inside story of the Soviet withdrawal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 162.
87. Op-cit., Marwat, 73-74.
88. Op-cit., Coll, 12.
89. Mohammad Yousaf, *Silent Soldier: The Man behind Afghan Jihad* (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1993), 11-12.
90. Op-cit., Coll, 123.
91. Dexter Filkins, "An Afghan Lion Looks at a Possible Final Stand," *Los Angeles Times*, April 26, 1999, accessed May 1, 2012, <http://articles.latimes.com/1999/apr/26/news/mn-31173/2>
92. Op-cit., Yousaf and Adkin, 146.
93. Ibid., 138.
94. Op-cit., Marwat, 70.
95. Op-cit., Bergen, 76.
96. Artemy M. Kalinovsky, *A Long Goodbye* (US: Harvard University Press, 2011), 30.
97. Op-cit., Cordovez and Harrison, 151, 247; Op-cit., Smith, 366.
98. Roy, "Afghanistan: An Islamic," 491.
99. Asta Olesen, *Islam and Politics in Afghanistan*, (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1995), 288
100. Quoted in Sanjay Suri "CIA worked with Pak to create Taliban", *India Abroad News Service*, March 6, 2001, accessed on 15 August 2013, <http://www.rawa.org/cia-talib.htm>

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48. Op-cit., Rashid, 186; Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 245.
49. Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 3.
50. Op-cit., Kheli, 68.
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54. Op-cit., Marwat, 137.
55. Op-cit., Kux, 247.
56. Ibid., 251.
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59. Op-cit., Bergen, 67.
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62. Op-cit., Yousaf and Adkin, 113.
63. Op-cit., Bergen, 68.
64. Op-cit., Yousaf and Adkin, 81.
65. S.Vali Nasr, "Islam, the State, and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan", in *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?* ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (New Delhi: Zed books, 2002), 92.
66. Op-cit., Marwat, 138.
67. Quoted in Frank Shanty, *The Nexus: International Terrorism and Drug Trafficking from Afghanistan* (California: Greenwood Publishing group, 2011), 68.
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70. Op-cit., Nixon, 10.
71. Op-cit., Coll, 86.
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 39. Op-cit., Kheli, 77.
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9. Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (London: Penguin Books; London, 2005) 113.
10. Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, (New York: I. B. Taurus, 1994), 50-52.
11. Opcit.,,Roy, 495.
12. Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War Inc., Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden*, (London: Phoenix, 2002), 113.
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14. Ibid., 495.
15. Bruce Koepke, *Iran's Policy on Afghanistan, The Evolution of Strategic Pragmatism* (Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2013), 3.
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security and global interests. One school of thought argues that the promotion of the phenomenon of Jihad to counter the Russian threat by establishing Islamists and madrasahs had destabilised Pakistan, and later this turned into sectarian violence and caused the current proliferation of violence and terrorism in Pakistan. In contrast, the other school of thought believes that it was Pakistan's state policy to counter the Indian and Soviet threat, because in the light of previous experiences of wars with India, Pakistan could not afford a two front war. Hence, it was in Pakistan's national interest and furthered its security needs to help Afghanistan against Russian invasion. Notwithstanding which school of thought seems more persuasive, there is general consensus that the roots of militancy, extremism, and sectarianism in Pakistan are due to its response to the Afghan war. However, the prevailing Indian threat and the Indian role in the dismemberment of Pakistan pushed Pakistan to adopt such a policy to avoid Soviet dominance in bilateral conflicts: notably Pashtunistan and the Durand line. So, it can be concluded that Pakistan was not acting as a tool of American policy, but rather that its policy was a reflection of defined national interests of that time. The US double standards were also revealed, as on one side, the US was disapproving of the Iranian revolution on the basis of its militant Islamic stance, whereas on the other hand the US was engaged with people who were used as militants against Soviet Union. This idea also created confusion among Pakistani society, with the view that the US only pursued goals for its national interests.

Conclusion:

Afghan Jihad was not pulley an Afghan affair rather it was an international issue in which almost every major state of the Islamic and Western world contributed to counter the Soviet aggression. Soviet invasion over Afghanistan did not only threatened Pakistan's territorial sovereignty and integrity but also endangered Islam in Afghanistan. United States raised and promoted the slogan of "jihad" in Afghanistan to get determined support from Muslim world against godless Communism. It can be concluded that Afghan Jihad was not only a Jihad but also a political struggle between Capitalism of US and Communism of Soviet Union. Pakistan had no other options at that time due to the fear of pincer movement.

Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, many proposals for neutrality were discussed because Karmal had no popular support in Afghanistan and was completely dependent on the Soviet Union.(96) Pakistan, under economic pressure from Afghan refugees and political pressure from the Soviet Union, was also in favour of political settlement. The Soviet Union had growing concerns over increasing use of drugs by its forces and wanted multilateral treaties between Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran before completing withdrawal of its forces, to end arms incursions, further effecting East-West relations and allow recognition of the Karmal regime.(97) Reagan was convinced that the Russians wanted to retreat, but the hardliners in the US wanted to take revenge for Vietnam. Meanwhile, under pressure from Congress, Reagan urged the Mujahideen to go for victory during a meeting with a delegation of Mujahideen in the White House. In April 1985, Reagan issued a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD No. 166) directed specifically at the Soviet presence in Afghanistan to drive the Soviets out of South Asia. To defeat Soviet air supremacy, the US decided to try its latest sophisticated stinger missiles by equipping the resistance forces, and those shoulder-launched anti-air craft missiles proved to be a turning point of the Afghan conflict by eliminating Soviet air superiority. The possession of stinger missiles by the Afghans was notably controversial, as some were concerned about technology transfer and some about Soviet aggression following US direct involvement in the conflict. Facing difficulty and losing the war, USSR pursued withdrawal from Afghanistan.

It was the first military defeat since the Second World War, and which resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was the first liberation war won by a movement which proclaimed Islam, and neither socialism nor nationalism, as its goal.(98) For Olesen, "The present Jihad is not for the watan (fatherland), but for Islam- the watan is only khak (dust)."(99) Pakistan executed the strategy in an efficient manner to defeat Soviet Union by supporting fighting groups in order to gain the strategic goals of Islamabad. The Russian defeat was celebrated as the victory of the US in the Cold War: notably in Afghanistan, as the US had spent billions of dollars in financing the resistance against Russia with the help of Pakistan.

Many in Pakistan still believe that the current extremism and terrorism is due to giving more power and money into the hands of these Islamist parties. The Islamist parties at the present time consider the US invasion in a similar manner to the way in which the US and these parties considered the Russian invasion in 1979. Harrison, a leading US expert on South Asia, recorded the same worry by claiming that, "I warned them that we were creating a monster... The CIA made a historic mistake in encouraging Islamic groups from all over the world to come to Afghanistan."(100)

Within Pakistan there has been debate on the issue of Afghan war since then, regarding whether the Afghan war was Pakistan's war or if Pakistan was acting as a mercenary to promote the narrative of Jihad for US

groups. The US, refugee leaders and most Afghan experts claimed that Pakistan sponsored fundamentalist groups due to political reasons. Wilson, a US representative, also claimed that, "Pakistan was totally committed to Hekmatyar because Zia saw the world as a conflict between Muslims and Hindus, and he thought that he could count on Hekmatyar to work for a Pan-Islamic entity that could stand up to India".(86) Marwat defended this policy by arguing that Hekmatyar's Hizb was a favourite of the Pakistani government because it was the most organised party, and praised western scientific rationale but rejected western values and had bias against Pashtun nationalists and Islamic nationalist groups.(87) Massoud criticised that the arms were not distributed fairly and "Pakistan had given them only eight missiles, despite military successes: For two years they cut all the aid to my group. The Pakistanis had their own agenda." (88) However, Brigadier Yousaf, who was involved in Afghan affairs, claimed that, "we allocated arms to the parties on the basis of operational effectiveness, but not as our critics claimed (including the US and CIA) on the basis of Islamic fundamentalism... A party got weapons allocated not on the basis of size or religious fervour but purely on operational efficiency."(89) In addition to this, ISI distrusted Massoud because of his dubious attitude as he made a truce with Soviet during Afghan war in 1983 and he also had links with Britain's MI6 and with the French, who were playing their own game, Coll unveiled.(90) Whereas, Massoud justified this ceasefire as allowing him to bargain for more time to build his forces against the Soviets. However, America claimed that Massoud did not fight against the Russians: rather he spent more time in setting up a vast political organisation across northern Afghanistan to prepare for future civil war.(91) Moreover, Hekmatyar not only had close associations with Pakistan, but also with Iran and the Egyptian Ikhwan-ul-Muslemeen (Muslim Brotherhood). It is pertinent to mention that Hekmatyar was also the CIA's favourite. Moreover, the Washington Post in May 1990 disclosed that Hekmatyar was a major heroin manufacturer and that the US had turned a blind eye on this issue "because U.S. narcotics policy in Afghanistan has been subordinated to the war against Soviet influence there."(92) Moreover, every party was supporting its favourite group, as the Saudis were giving money to Sayyaf, because of his personal contacts in Saudi Arabia.(93)

In a broader context, the Afghan resistance movement can be classified into three categories; one, The Peshawar-Based Seven, second, the Tehran Based Eight, and third, those without a base outside Afghanistan.(94) Pakistan's policy of giving more money to Islamists was criticised by many, but Pakistan justified it by winning the war and was praised for this by the US. In 1993. Robert Gates, CIA Chief, defended the ISI's Afghan policy by stating, "Their approach (the Pakistanis) was that the assistance would be funnelled to those groups that were fighting most effectively against the Soviets. A lot of them (the Afghan Mujahideen) weren't people you'd invite home for dinner. The reality is that you had to make do with the strategic situation you found in Afghanistan."(95)

Danger” to motivate the Mujahideen against the godless foe, the Red Army. The number of Mujahideen who took active part in combat had grown to 150,000 in 1986 from only 45, 000 in 1981-83.(77) Ahmed Rashid, an expert Pakistani journalist on Afghan affairs, reported that some 35,000 foreign Islamists served in Afghanistan between 1982 and 1992.(78)

Unity among factions within Afghan groups appeared after the 1979 Russian invasion, when the rulers fled to exile, the local people fought along with foreigners who were against the foreign occupation not only to defend the state itself but also to save Muslim Ummah from foreign invasion. However, the Afghan resistance against the Red Army had never been a purely Afghan affair. Both Pakistan and the USA had been immersed in Afghanistan since the initial days of the Afghan war, Pakistan, by providing shelter to Afghan refugees and safe havens to Mujahideen, and the US by providing arms and money for the Mujahideen. Pashtuns along with Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara shifted to Pakistan for semi collaborative efforts against the Soviet Red Army. The border area had become a centre and decisive force of Anti Kabul resistance because the Durand line was playing same role for the Mujahideen that Ammudraya was playing for Russia. The US encouraged Pakistan to use the term “Pashtun” in order to use Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s tribal ethnic affiliations to get Russia out of Afghanistan.(79) Later on, the Taliban exploited the same term, for Pashtun unity, to pursue their objectives by gathering support in FATA to get America out. The Pashtuns have rarely acted as a collective and coherent society and all efforts by the different leaders to unite them in previous eras had been futile, but their nationalist solidarity and coherence could be observed whenever a foreign power invaded.

Furthermore, Washington’s military supplies and economic aid to Pakistan nourished Zia ul-Haq’s Islamisation in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The primarily Pashtun-dominated Islamist groups were supported by the main Islamist parties: notably Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), predominantly in Pakistan’s Pashtun regions.(80) The Hezb-i-Islami of Hekmatyar was patronised by JI and JUI and supported the groups of students which later turned into the Taliban.(81) ISI consolidated the multiple Afghan splinter groups into seven major parties known as the “Peshawar Seven”, of which six were dominantly Pashtuns, and distributed money and arms among them.(82) Three of the groups were moderate or traditionalist, favouring the pre-Daud status quo, and the re-emergence of monarchy, whereas four were Islamists or fundamentalists, favouring the establishment of an Islamic state, not a monarchy.(83) However, Weinbaum and others asserted that Pakistan gave the major share of aid to Hekmatyar, but, in fact, the lion’s share, around 67-73 percent, went to Islamist groups/fundamentalist parties, but not more than 20 percent to single party.(84) As a result of this, the fortunes of the Islamists became stronger and the royalist and traditionalist groups in Afghanistan declined. The local Afghan leaders were also forced to ally with one of these groups to gain assistance and armament.(85) Resultantly, Hezb and Jamiat emerged as the leaders of exile

his efforts, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Yemen provided the lion's share of Afghan Arab fighters and Saudi Airlines gave a 75 per cent discount to Mujahideen going to fight the Holy war. Nixon paid tribute to these holy warriors by revealing that "the independent Moslem tribesmen launched a jihad, or holy war, in a struggle to the death for control of their country and of their lives. Insurgents sold their cattle and their wives' jewellery to buy ammunition." (70) Bin Laden set up offices in Pakistan, the US and Afghanistan to raise funds from Saudi Arabia, recruited fighters from all over the world, and used the financial resources of his family business in building a base in Afghanistan. Badeeb, a Saudi intelligence officer involved in the Afghan war and teacher of bin Laden, disclosed that bin Laden did not trust the officials of Pakistani intelligence: hence he preferred to deliver his charity through private political and religious networks. (71) Saudi Arabia supported the Mujahideen and gave them the same money in dollars as given by the US as they were not good at military operations but at the signing of cheques. Saudi gave aid directly to some groups: notably Sayyaf, and indirectly to both Pakistan and to the CIA for the Afghan operation. Furthermore, Saudi established religious seminaries (madrassas) across Pakistan and Afghanistan, and particularly on their bordering area, to recruit and train fighters and Zia ul-Haq supported this policy. These madrassas were the places in Afghanistan from where the Taliban emerged and were later joined by their counterparts from Pakistani madrassas.

Both the US and USSR were pouring money into Afghanistan indirectly and directly respectively. The Soviet Union was investing money in Afghanistan by providing technical assistance, school teachers, food aid, and different projects of major road building, brickworks, and construction of factories, battery farms, local fish hatcheries, and free medical care. (72) However, these efforts were not successful in bringing any socio-political change in attitudes towards the USSR. Giustozzi revealed that these fighters destroyed schools, hospitals and energy facilities and killed teachers. (73) It is very important to mention that these Mujahideen were never condemned by the western world: rather the West supported their activities by encouraging and supporting them during the Afghan war. However, they were termed as brutal, inhuman and terrorist when they burnt schools or tried to close them down after the US invasion of Afghanistan. This dualistic policy created distress in Pakistani society that when they were burning schools for US interests, they were Mujahideen and later on, when they were forbidding girls to join school, they were called terrorists and Islamic extremists.

The US funding to the Mujahideen rose from almost \$30-\$60 million in 1981 to almost \$400-\$600 million annually in the mid-1980s. (74) According to a rough estimate, until the late 1980s, almost \$3 billion was funnelled to the Afghan resistance. (75) The CIA was paying money to Pakistan for the salary of officials and employees, rent payment of refugee offices, maintenance and construction of warehouses, and transport. (76) The CIA and ISI both coined the slogan of "Holy War" and "Islam in

others wanted to favour the Kabul regime due to their pro-Pashtunistan stance. Some criticised Pakistan's Afghan policy due to its role as proxy for US interests to counter Russia in the bipolar world, whereas the above mentioned facts clearly indicate that it was in Pakistan's national interests to stop Russian expansionist policy. In fact, Aga Shahi, Pakistan's foreign minister, categorically made it clear that Pakistan wanted to use the aid in such a way that the state would not look like "a tool of Washington." (61) Moreover, it was Pakistan who controlled the supply of weapons and training to the Mujahideen, and not the CIA. Yousaf and Adkin disclosed that Pakistan sent military personnel to fight along with the Mujahideen secretly. (62) Pakistan was not in favour of US direct involvement for two reasons: one, because if the Soviets captured US men, there would be severe consequences for Pakistan; and second, because the concept of Jihad would be harmed if the Mujahideen saw Americans and they would understand it as an American war to drive the Soviets out instead of Jihad. Likewise, both the CIA and the US did not want their direct involvement, for two reasons; first, due to fear of Soviet blame on seeing American personnel operating on Afghanistan's soil; and second, the Afghan Arabs did not like Westerners and had always demonstrated 'pathological dislike' towards them. (63) Brigadier Yousaf, who ran ISI's Afghan operation between 1983 and 1987, revealed that the CIA was supporting the Mujahideen by spending the money for buying arms, equipment and ammunition. (64) Moreover, the US was not allowed inside Afghanistan due to Zia's mistrust of the US. Although the CIA was not involved directly, it secretly enrolled some Mujahideen and paid agents to access details of the ground reality. (65)

As a quid pro quo, Pakistan received heavy economic, military and diplomatic support from across the capitalist and Muslim world, and notably from the US, Saudi Arabia, the UK, China, Israel, the Gulf States, Egypt and the European countries. Pakistan, being a geostrategically important country, became a frontline ally in the war against Soviet Union and recruited Mujahideen from all over the world. The Afghans fought the war, whereas the foreigners built roads, guarded buildings and assisted local forces. (66) Bearden, the former CIA station chief in Pakistan, commented that "the idea that the Afghans somehow needed fighters from outside their culture was deeply flawed and ignored basic historical and cultural facts." (67) This was the time when the seed of Jihad was sown in Pakistan and Afghanistan with the help of the USA, Saudi Arabia and many other Muslim countries. To prevent the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the US government continued to support the presence of Jihadists, and notably bin Laden and his lieutenants, from across the Muslim world. (68) Bergen pointed that Abdullah Azzam, Ph.D. in Islamic Jurisprudence from Al-Azhar University, Cairo, known as the Oxford of the Muslim world, based in Pakistan, played vital role in Afghan Jihad by declaring the defence of a Muslim land as an obligation for every Muslim. (69) Azzam travelled all over the world to convince people to support Afghan Jihad and as a result of

“an Islamic brotherhood which ignored territorial frontiers” Marwat claimed.(54) Moreover, Pakistan was the only option as a conduit for weapons to Jihadists because neighbouring states of Afghanistan, and notably China and the Khomeini’s Iran, were hardly sympathetic towards the US against Russia. Hence, the US Congress, who had earlier cut US aid to Pakistan due to the poor human rights record of Zia, supported Pakistan. President Carter declared, “we will provide military equipment, food and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and national security against the seriously increased threat from the north.”(55) In mid-1980, the Carter administration offered Pakistan \$400 million in aid to get Pakistan on board in the Capitalism camp against Communism. However, Zia rejected the Carter administration’s aid offer by calling it “peanuts”, and exploited the situation skilfully by manipulating American interests in the region and in the Cold War. Although the aid was rejected, the CIA was increasingly cooperating with ISI on the Afghan war.(56) For the initial six months, Pakistan fought the war alone without any external assistance successfully. Feeling the need at the time, in 1981, the new incumbent Reagan administration announced heavy military and economic aid to Pakistan worth US \$3.25 billion, with the suspension of the uranium-enrichment sanction provisions of the Glenn-Symington Amendment and the selling of 40 F-16 fighter planes.(57) Pakistan was the essential character and playing a vital role in connecting the western world and the Mujahideen by assisting them with finances and armaments. Charlie Wilson, the Texas Democrats representative, was an ardent supporter of the Mujahideen. He pursued congressional committee members on the vote to fund by claiming,

“It is our sacred duty to make valuable the lives that these people are laying down...The US had nothing whatsoever to do with these people’s decision to fight. The Afghan made this decision at Christmas and they are going to fight to the last, even if they have to fight with stones, but we will be damned by history if we let them fight with stones.”(58)

The CIA performed the job of arming the fighters by using American and Saudi funds to purchase weapons from Egypt and China, so that the US support could not be traced.(59) The US national security advisor, Brzezinski, disclosed in an interview that they provided weapons to the Mujahideen from various sources: notably Soviet arms from the Czechoslovakian communist government and from the Soviet army to the Mujahideen because their army was increasingly corrupt.(60)

Within NWFP (now KPK), there was a split among the ANP, the major political party and once champion of Pashtunistan, on the issue of the Afghan war. Some members wanted to favour the Mujahideen whereas